Unfortunately, coups are back in West Africa. The return of putschs and military juntas erodes incremental progress on the democratic process made over the years in the subregion. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been criticised as heavy-handed in its strategy to quell the resurgence of coups and negotiate the return of democracy in the affected nations.

While this most certainly is not a West African problem- shown by the recent Gabonese military coup in 2023, which deposed President Ali Bongo, it seems that there are certain factors present across Sahelian states in West Africa, which have occasioned political discontent and encouraged the military intervention in an attempt to solve these problems. In focus, the nations of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have all seen the overthrow of democratically elected governments, in addition to Chad and Guinea in West Africa and Gabon in Central Africa. In August 2020, Colonel Assimi Goita led a coup that ousted sitting Malian president Ibrahim Keita after prolonged protests over alleged government corruption and insecurity. A second coup occurred within a year, in May 2021, with the Malian military detaining the interim president and prime minister, resulting in Assimi Goita declaring himself head of state. 

Similarly, in Burkina Faso, two coups occurred within eight months. In January 2022, military officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba removed President Roch Marc Kabore, citing the government’s failure to curb Jihadist insurgency in the country. Eight months later, Captain Ibrahim Traore led a second coup to overthrow Lt.Col. Damiba, claiming an inability to address the nation’s security issues. Finally, and more recently, the Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum was ousted by the members of his presidential guard led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, citing massive governance failures and security concerns. 

The successful conduct of these coups across West African neighbours has become a source of concern for the ECOWAS leadership under the auspices of the Nigerian President, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Chairman of the ECOWAS. While there were initial preliminary negotiations with the juntas to return to military rule, it was the imminent threat of use of force against the Nigerien junta which has seemed to spiral events out of control, culminating in the abrupt attempt by Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso to leave the bloc and coalescing in the formation of the AES (Alliance of Sahel States) in September 2023. ECOWAS initially rejected the proposed attempt at leaving the bloc, as the nations must follow the articles that prescribe a one-year notice before termination of membership. 

To address the recent spate of coups in West Africa, the ECOWAS leadership must rethink its strategy in the Sahel and return to the negotiating table. It must seek an audience, dialogue and build bridges to ensure that the remote causes of these coups in the region are given the attention they deserve. Three core strategies are recommended here to start this process. While there is no silver bullet or magic wand, ECOWAS must retrace its steps and toe the line of kinship and the Pan-African bond that characterised the mission of the bloc's founders. 

Strategy One: Back-Channel Diplomacy Under Chatham Rules‍

The junta has accused the ECOWAS leadership of operating under foreign influence. The common theme among the nations in focus (AES States) is the hostile treatment towards French interests in the Sahel. France had previously enjoyed a good relationship with these nations due to their shared colonial history, trade, and peace-keeping efforts. Currently, the relationship has become sour. The Jihadist groups in the Sahel, Boko-Haram, and the Islamic State-West Africa Province (ISWAP) have wreaked havoc in these nations. While the French-led G5 Coalition (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Chad) has mainly been successful in operation serval (2013-2014), the succeeding operation barkhane has been an uphill battle for the coalition, leading to loss of lives and disillusionment in the civilian population. 

The ECOWAS leadership should encourage negotiations through back channels, especially as tensions are currently high amid the distrust of the military juntas. As a rule of high-level meetings, the Chatham House rules allow participants to speak freely without fear of being quoted by a third party to the outside world. This method was employed successfully in negotiating the first Oslo Accords (OSLO I) between Israel and Palestine, with Norway as a neutral host and intermediary. ECOWAS could emulate this method by adapting accordingly with a neutral venue for negotiations and a neutral facilitator to reestablish trust with the juntas, reduce diplomatic isolation and welcome these nations back into the fold. This enables the ECOWAS leadership to re-open relations and keep the line of communication active.

‍

Strategy Two: Collaboration on Security- Keep the Sahel Safe

The remote factors which have occasioned the military takeovers in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso include bad governance, insecurity across the Sahel, low human development index (HDI), weak institutions and rising poverty levels, to mention a few. The economic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS have considerably shrunken the Malian economy, which is landlocked, making it difficult to access ports for trade purposes in the West African sub-region.

However, the junta has cited the insecurity fostered by the jihadist insurgents as a recurring theme in its takeover of political affairs. While Operation Serval, conducted by the French-led G5 Sahel forces, was mainly successful in liberating the towns of Gao and Timbuktu in Mali, the more recent Operation Barkhane has faced considerable resistance from the insurgents and resulted in a protracted battle. 

ECOWAS needs a new template to collaborate on security for its Sahelian member states. This would address one of the core concerns of the juntas, which has prioritised security as a yardstick to measure its progress while in power. In the past, ECOWAS formed ECOMOG (The ECOWAS Monitoring Group) as a special military intervention unit, to address issues of civil war, unrest and the maintenance of peace in West Africa. ECOMOG was largely successful, especially during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars, from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. To collaborate on security in the Sahel, the ECOWAS leadership must show commitment, tact and long-term vision. While an adaptation of ECOMOG might not be best suited to deal with the current realities, the need for a competent peace-keeping/counter-insurgency group is glaring. 

An unconventional idea would be to partner with the A.E.S. to aid their fight against the jihadist and separatist groups operating in these regions, including the ISGS (Islamic State Sahel Province) and the Azawad Movement. This move would be a precarious alliance, if allowed, as the A.E.S. has already severed ties with most Western states over military actions in the Sahel, opting instead to embrace a partnership with Russia and, by extension, the infamous Wagner Group, to oversee operations. 

To avoid muddling the water further, such a partnership between ECOWAS and AES should strictly limit partial funding and logistical support for the national armies and ground forces of AES states, especially as these states already contravene the African Union’s Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. 

‍

Strategy Three: A Clear-Tiered Roadmap and Reward System for the Return of Democracy

Timelines are essential for any real progress towards the re-actualisation of democracy in the AES states. The threat of military intervention by ECOWAS to restore democracy has been frowned upon, pushing the AES states towards a mutual defence pact with a collective protection clause similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, signalling that an armed attack against one AES state is an attack against all AES states.

However, after a possible diffusion of tensions, the ECOWAS leadership must present a tiered roadmap for the return of democracy in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. The encouraging factor in this equation would be the formal normalisation of relations, shelving diplomatic isolation tactics, removing both general and targeted sanctions, and promoting and liberalising sub-regional trade to boost the affected local economies. 

The ECOWAS leadership in the tier system must give priority and timelines for the actualisation of the following:

• Tier One: Encouraging free press and upholding the ECOWAS treaty
• Tier Two: Drafting and signing transitional agreements 
• Tier Three: Electoral reform 
• Tier Four:  The unconditional release of all political prisoners, including former heads of state and their family members. 
• Tier Five: Holding free and fair democratic elections and organising a peaceful handover to civilian rule. 

 Looking Beyond the Present

The objectives of ECOWAS returning to the negotiation table with the nations of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso is to show that while military coups will not be tolerated, the ECOWAS leadership is not blind to the plights of the local populations and would not act as a barrier to the protection of lives and the economic advancement of West Africans. However, in doing so, ECOWAS must lay a precedent of obedience to the ECOWAS treaty and the overarching African Union treatise. Military intervention should only be considered where there are blatant abuses of human rights in these member states or a total breakdown of law and order. 

With the right personnel, objectives, and a commitment to a peaceful symbiotic outcome, ECOWAS could dispel the public notion of weak and ineffective leadership that has recently plagued its affairs and decision-making. The founding ideals of pan-africanism must be at the forefront of the negotiation agenda, alongside advocating sub-regional multilateralism involving all member states' safety, security, and economic prosperity.  

The Human Development Index is compiled and assessed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to assess the social and economic development levels of countries. It ranks countries by three main dimensions: health, education, and standard of living. 

References

Adekaiyaoja, A. (2024). Alliance of Sahel States (AES): Yet another regional bloc in West Africa. Centre for Democracy and Development. Retrieved from https://www.cddwestafrica.org/blog/alliance-of-sahel-states-aes-yet-another-regional-bloc-in-west-africa/

Al Jazeera. (2022, February 17). Timeline: Nine years of French troops in Mali. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/17/timeline-what-led-france-to-withdraw-its-troops-from-mali

Byaruhanga, C. (2023, August 11). Niger coup: Fear and anger in Niamey as ECOWAS threatens force. BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-66478983

Campbell, J. (2021, November 11). Coups are back in West Africa. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/blog/coups-are-back-west-africa

European Union Agency for Asylum. (2021). Country guidance Nigeria 2021. Retrieved from https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-nigeria-2021/131-boko-haram-including-jas-iswap-and-ansaru

Ferdjani, H. (2024, February 8). Economic hardship, insecurity spike in Mali as ECOWAS exit looms. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/2/8/economic-hardship-insecurity-spirals-in-mali-as-ecowas-exit-looms

Henry, A., & Murray, E. (2023, August 31). What to know about Gabon’s coup. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/what-know-about-gabons-coup

Issoufou, T., & Chibelushi, W. (2023, October 10). Niger junta refuses to free ex-leader Mohamed Bazoum and have sanctions dropped. BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67685437

King, I. (2023). How France failed Mali: The end of Operation Barkhane. Harvard International Review. Retrieved from https://hir.harvard.edu/how-france-failed-mali-the-end-of-operation-barkhane/

Organisation of African Unity. (1977). Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa. Retrieved from https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37287-treaty-0009_-_oau_convention_for_the_elimination_of_mercenarism_in_africa_e.pdf

Statista. (2021). Human development index score of Africa as of 2021, by country. Statista. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/1244496/human-development-index-of-africa-by-country/

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (1949). The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty). Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf

‍